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The South African law of contract provides three broad types of remedies in the 
event of breach of contract:1 
 
i. Remedies aimed at keeping the contract alive;  
ii. Remedies aimed at cancelling the agreement; and  
iii. Remedies aimed at compensating the innocent party for loss or harm 
caused by the breach. 
 
The claim for contractual damages is a remedy in the third category serving a 
compensatory function in the law of contract as a matter of corrective justice. The 
jurisprudential underpinning and reason for its grant have been a prominent issue in 
contract law theory and have been explored and analysed in depth.2 For instance 
Fuller and Perdue‟s seminal work The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 
provides a distinctive purposive understanding of contract theory through its 
compensatory function in the form of contractual damages.3 But a topic often less 
explored or considered is the underpinning of an order of specific performance, 
being a remedy of the first category above in upholding and enforcing the contract. 
Specific performance, or giving it its Latin terminology, performance in forma 
                                                          
1
 See D Hutchison, C Pretorius, J du Plessis, S Eiselen, T Floyd, L Hawthorne, B Kuschke, C Maxwell 
& T Naude The Law of Contract in South Africa (2009) 310. 
2
 However, the source of the obligation for compensation upon breach is another matter of far less 
clarity, being the subject of extensive debate; See further S van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB 
Reinecke & GF Lubbe Contract – General Principles 4 ed (2012) 288-290; See also D Hutchison Law 
of Contract 326-327. 
3
 L Fuller & W Perdue Jr “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages – 1” (1936) 46 Yale Law Journal 






specifica, is the enforcement of the performance as in the form the contractants 
agreed.4 However, J C de Wet and A H van Wyk‟s traditional construction described 
specific performance as also taking another form, namely as „damages as a 
surrogate of performance‟.5 
Therefore on proper conception of De Wet‟s taxonomy the remedy of specific 
performance exists in two forms: as specific performance in the strict sense and as 
an objective monetary substitute as a surrogate for the agreed performance. This 
idea is authoritatively expressed by Van Heerden JA for the Appellate Division in 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells Consultants (Pty) Ltd v Bowthorpe Hellerman Deutsch (Pty) 
Ltd6 in finding that a plaintiff may „claim performance, either in forma specifica … or 
by way of damages in lieu of performance‟. This traditional distinction by De Wet is 
further accepted and reinforced by the Supreme Court of Appeal in ISEP Structural 
Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd7 which has 
controversially been considered a rejection of the availability of an independent claim 
for a monetary surrogate in lieu of performance.8 
There is a terminological difficulty in this label of „damages as a surrogate of 
performance‟ when one is proposing the concept as under the paradigm of specific 
performance, for two reasons. First, the award of the remedy is not one of 
performance as agreed between the parties, being in the form of a monetary 
substitute; or even compensation for the performance as then there would be no 
distinction in function with an award for contractual damages. And secondly it in fact 
seems to have led to a conceptual overlap with the notion of contractual damages 
and a failure to distinguish the remedy as a form of specific performance, and 
therefore as to what interest it protects as a monetary substitute for specific 
performance in forma specifica. Having noted these two issues the purpose of this 
paper is to reconsider this understanding of surrogate damages in the current South 
African law of contract, both theoretically and evaluatively, following Smalberger 
ADCJ‟s dictum on behalf of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mostert NO v Old 
                                                          
4
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 328-334. 
5
 As translated from “daadwerklike vervulling en skadevergoeding as surrogaat van die prestasie” in 
JC de Wet & AH van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992) 208-214. 
6
 1991 1 SA 525 (A) para 530. 
7
 1981 4 SA 1 (A). 
8
 There is criticism concerning the identification of the ratio in ISEP Structural Engineering and Plating 
(Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 1 (A) which will be considered further below in 
section 8; See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 329 who posit that Jansen JA‟s remarks on 
surrogate damages may have been obiter as his judgment construes the plea as being for contractual 





Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd9 which calls for this area of the law to be 
reconsidered after numerous criticisms against the decision in ISEP.10 
 
2 The remedy of damages as a surrogate of specific performance distinguished 
 
„Damages as a surrogate for performance‟ has been described in the legal 
literature as being an award granted in lieu of specific performance for the creditor to 
claim the objective monetary value of the agreed performance which is not received, 
in its entirety or in part, as a result of the debtor‟s breach.11 This construction is 
theoretically problematic. 
 
2 1 The award of contractual damages distinguished 
This remedy is significantly different to the traditional remedy of contractual 
damages where the claimant must prove actual suffered loss as a result of a breach 
of contract. Given that the basis of contractual damages is underpinned by 
compensation for the loss in the performance, it therefore seems theoretically 
inconsistent to underpin surrogate damages also upon the interest in the 
performance. When granted as an objective or equivalent monetary surrogate it 
seems merely to bypass the loss enquiry of contractual damages and so avoids the 
rules of mitigation of loss and the contemplation principle.  
This label of the remedy has as such perhaps led to a blurring of the conceptual 
distinction between this remedy and that of contractual damages. The remedy was 
proposed by De Wet as a concept under the paradigm of specific performance and 
as such it is not surprising that there has been significant confusion surrounding the 
concept and its application through failing to draw a distinction between the id quoud 
interest damage and this unique damage as a substitute for specific performance.12 
This distinction is not even one of the „types of damages‟13 but of the natures of the 
remedies themselves. If it were merely a substitute for the interest in the 
                                                          
9
 2001 4 SA 159 (SCA). 
10
 Mostert NO v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd 2001 4 SA 159 (SCA) 186 referring to Oelofse 
(1982) THRHR 61 63-65; Van Immerzeel & Pohl and Another v Samancor Ltd 2001 CLR 32 (SCA) 
45-46; JC De Wet & AH Van Wyk Kontraktereg 212; HJ Erasmus, JJ Gauntlet & PJ Visser “Damages” 
in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds)  LAWSA 7 2 ed (2004) para 45. 
11
 See Erasmus, Gauntlet & Visser “Damages” in LAWSA 7 para 45; D Hutchison & F du Bois 
“Contracts in General” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 733 876; 
Van der Merwe et al Contract 328; Hutchision Contract 314; JM Potgieter, L Steynberg & TB Floyd 
Visser & Potgieter Law of Damages 3 ed (2012) 201. 
12







performance as a type of damage then there would be no distinction in the purpose 
served by contractual damages and this particular remedy as both are then just 
compensating for the loss in the performance. The remedy as such has had an 
unfortunate terminological identification which has blurred its conceptual 
underpinning as a form of specific performance.14  
 
2 2 The award of an objective monetary surrogate reconsidered  
According to the classification as a form of specific performance one should 
theoretically be able to claim the surrogate remedy in conjunction to an award for 
compensation of provable loss.15 A failure to draw a conceptual distinction between 
the remedies is a failure to distinguish the purpose of these remedies. In other words 
it fails to consider the construction of available rights by presupposing the 
appropriate remedy.16 When described as a remedy for the objective monetary value 
of performance it cannot be explained by the rights and obligations flowing from the 
                                                          
14
 See Deloitte Haskins & Sells Consultants (Pty) Ltd v Bowthorpe Hellerman Deutsh (Pty) Ltd 1991 1 
SA 525 (A) where Van Heerden JA states in para 530 that a plaintiff „may … claim performance either 
in forma specifica … or by way of damages in lieu of performance‟; See also Erasmus, Gauntlet & 
Visser “Damages” in LAWSA 7 para 45 where described as an alternative claim for specific 
performance as “damages as a surrogate of the whole or missing art of the performance (that is 
damages as the objective financial equivalent of performance)” (emphasis added); See Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 328 as being labelled “damages as a surrogate of performance”. This latter label 
is a direct translation of J C De Wet‟s traditional construction in De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 208; 
See also Hutchison & Du Bois “Contracts” in Wille’s Principles 876-877 which states it as “damages 
as a substitute for the missing part performance, or as a complement of defective or incomplete 
performance”; Cf Jansen JA in ISEP Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration 
Co (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 1 (A) 7 who describes it as the „objective value of the performance in lieu of 
specific performance‟ as quoted from National Butchery Co v African Merchants Ltd 1907 EDC 57; It 
is on this notable change of terminology that this paper will attempt to present a theory that can 
account for the difference in the purpose of remedies for damages for failed performance and 
damages as surrogate for specific performance. 
15
 Such a position of loss which is not covered by an equivalent monetary surrogate performance can 
be explained on Fuller and Perdue‟s Reliance Interest in that the surrogate performance may, but not 
always, account for the restitution interest. But this is not always so, for the reliance interest may be 
greater than a monetary substitute and so a claim for damages as compensation for the 
consequential id quod loss should still be available; See Fuller & Perdue (1936) Yale Law Journal 53-
54. Note that Fuller and Perdue‟s theory is one for the explanation of damages, and given the 
distinction of surrogate damages as one of specific performance, there will not be an exact correlation 
in compensation as the interest protected in specific performance is not the same as those identified 
interests for damages. The parallel is drawn as a useful guide to reveal the value in demarcating set 
interests, but also to note its clear distinction to what will be developed as the „specific performance 
interest‟; See also Hutchison & Du Bois “Contracts” in Wille’s Principles 876 which acknowledges the 
distinction of surrogate damages and consequential damages and notes therefore that they are in 
theory both claimable where the plaintiff has not rescinded the contract. 
16
 A theory of contract needs to properly consider the correlation of rights and remedy; See the very 
informative and insightful article C Webb “Performance and Compensation: An Analysis of Contract 
Damages and Contractual Obligation” (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 41 for an analysis of 
the rights being protected in contract. Webb which furthers the understanding and analysis of the 
„performance interest‟, an idea which is adopted in this paper, as more complete reconceptualization 
of Fuller and Perdue‟s expectation interest in accounting for the position of fulfilling performance 





performance as shown above, but so too it cannot be explained by an order of 
specific performance. First, it is not the performance the contractants agreed, being 
a substitute damages award; and secondly it does not necessarily effect the same 
patrimonial result as a claim for specific performance as it does not account for what 
reciprocal obligations may rest on the party being awarded an order of specific 
performance.17 
The theoretical problem underlying the description and label given to the remedy 
as an objective monetary surrogate in modern literature is therefore that it fails to 
consider what interest is served by its award. Contractual damages oblige to 
compensate as substitute for the agreed performance, so placing the plaintiff in the 
position as if performance were duly forthcoming per the contract; whereas 
compensation in lieu of specific performance would place the plaintiff in the financial 
position as if specific performance had been granted. As such a different explanation 
for the basis of surrogate damages in South African law will be considered by a 
theory which considers the interest which damages in lieu of specific performance 
would substitute. It will then be suggested that it is a mistake to describe it as an 
award for a monetary „equivalent‟18 to the promised performance or such similar 
construction for lack of theoretical consistency with the nature of the remedy as a 
form of specific performance.  
 
3 A theory of specific performance interest damages 
 
If one considers the remedy as damages in lieu of specific performance, as was 
accepted by all five judges in ISEP,19 then the interest that underlies the award is 
that which underlies a grant in specific performance and not that of the performance. 
The interest protected by this form of specific performance differs from that of a 
                                                          
17
 This can be demonstrated by a breach to transfer property. If one were to award an objective 
monetary surrogate of the performance, it is not effecting the same position as specific performance, 
as this substitute performance does not account for possible incidental obligations on the transferee. 
In other words certain deductions from the monetary value of the performance could be needed to 
effect transfer of the property as would be the case with an order of specific performance; See the 
discussion of Semelhago v Paramadevan 1996 2 SCR 415; 136 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC) below in section 
3. 
18
 As taken from the description in Erasmus, Gauntlet & Visser “Damages” in LAWSA 7 para 45; see 
also Van der Merwe et al Contract 328; Similar construction follows in the legal literature despite not 
using the epithet „equivalent‟ as can be seen from the sources noted in n 11 above. 
19
 ISEP Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 1 (A)  
where Jansen JA, Van Winsen AJA 16 (Kotzé JA concurring) and Hoexter AJA 17 (Viljoen JA 
concurring) all regarded the claim for the cost of performance as being one for specific performance in 





compensatory interest in an award of damages, despite being effected in the form of 
a monetary substitute.20  As such should surrogate damages be awardable in the 
event of breach, the plaintiff could although having a lower or even no compensatory 
interest in the performance upon breach, could still have a promissory interest in its 
performance by expectation of an award of specific performance. This idea is foreign 
when one tries to peg its understanding on the notion of traditional damages as this 
tends to associate the compensatory paradigm of damages for the performance 
within its notion. But when one considers it from this construction one is looking to 
compensate the interest underlying specific performance. To fail to distinguish these 
underlying interests is to hold a view with only one eye open.21 
Therefore, in order to understand the interest a plaintiff can have in a grant of 
damages as a surrogate of specific performance one must understand the interest a 
plaintiff has in specific performance and the reason a court would grant this remedy, 
which has traditionally not received as detailed a treatment in legal literature as 
contractual damages.22 Fuller and Perdue‟s seminal work on the so-called „interest 
analysis approach‟ of contractual damages provides a useful tool to understand the 
theoretical underpinning of damages.23 But as noted by Daniel Friedmann,24 a 
problem with Fuller and Perdue‟s work is that it does not give an account of the 
relevance of specific performance. Reliance Interest approaches an understanding 
of contractual rights through the lens of contractual damages, which are merely a 
substitute for performance to compensate for the loss suffered upon breach. But this 
is not the whole story. It is a trite principle in South African law that contractual 
damages are only a secondary remedy; and that specific performance is the primary 
remedy for breach.25 In light of this understanding it would seem our hybrid legal 
tradition accords more prominent significance to the plaintiff‟s interest in specific 
performance. This also follows practical reasoning as surely the essence of a 
                                                          
20
 See Bestaway Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Western Credit Bank Ltd 1968 3 SA 400 (T) 404; Uni-Erections 
v Continental Enginerring Co Ltd 1981 1 SA 240 (W) 248; Masters v Thain t/a Inhaca Safaris 2000 1 
SA 467 (W) 474; also GF Lubbe and CM Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract – Cases, Materials 
and Commentary (1988) 593. 
21
 A phrase adopted from L Smith “Understanding Specific Performance” in N Cohen & E McKendrick 
(eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (2005) 221 and for which I would give thanks. 
22
 See Smith “Understanding Specific Performance” in Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract 
for an insightful excursus on the jurisprudential reasoning of providing an award of specific 
performance as remedy. 
23
 Fuller & Perdue (1936) Yale Law Journal 52. 
24
 D Friedmann "The Performance Interest in Damages"  (1995) 111 Quarterly Law Review 628 629. 
25
 See Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A); ISEP Structural Engineering 
and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 1 (A); Unibank Savings and Loans 





contract is its actual performance. Purposively considered a contract is not made for 
its expectation interest, but the actual fulfilment of its performance.26 
As such a proper theory of South African law of contract needs to consider and 
distinguish two distinct contractual interests of the plaintiff.27 That is first, the interest 
in receiving the promised performance, the „performance interest‟28 – that is to be put 
in the position as according to the terms of the contract. Although this is a similar 
formulation to Fuller and Perdue‟s expectation interest which seeks to „put the 
plaintiff in as good a position as he would have occupied had the defendant 
performed his promise‟,29 it must be remembered that this latter formulation is one 
expressed through the lens of compensation.30 And secondly, the interest a plaintiff 
has upon breach to a grant of an order of specific performance – the „specific 
performance interest‟.31 Although a grant of specific performance can more fully 
realise and protect the performance interest of a plaintiff than would a compensatory 
substitute therefore, a grant of specific performance can actually go even further 
                                                          
26
 Such is intuitive in many service-based contracts. One is not at the time of contracting always 
concerned with changes in one‟s patrimonial position calculated in accordance with market values; 
but contracts on a different expectation, an expectation that actually the contract will be duly honoured 
and fulfilled. Such can be exampled by a case where one contracts for the services of a plumber. One 
is not contracting to gain the expectation interest in the patrimonial losses engendered upon failure; 
one contracts to actually fulfil the promised service – the expectation interest merely serves as a 
corrective upon breach, a compensatory mechanism to serve to protect against the wrongful loss 
suffered on failed performance. It also acts as a guard to protect against breach – a preventative 
measure to avoid the breach. But what where the contract is one for a wedding photographer? Can 
one adequately compensate for breach of this service by the mere patrimonial loss suffered? And so 
does one effectively guard against the breach? See the Scottish case of Diesen v Samson 1971 SLT 
(Sh Ct) 49 which concerned this very scenario. Can one properly guard against the unilateral breach 
by the photographer in such an instance, bearing in mind the value of the photographer‟s service has 
no significant patrimonial gain, but is really only one of sentimental value that the promisee attaches 
to the performance? It would seem ordinary contractual damages would not accord much prevention 
to a choice by the photographer to breach the contract. As such it would seem South African law does 
not fully protect the performance interest of such a plaintiff by deterring the breach, nor provide 
appropriate compensation for the breach. There is an interest a plaintiff has in the actual 
performance, which holds a subjective element of value unaccounted for by an objectively calculated 
substitute. This idea is discussed in greater depth in the original version of this paper which considers 
the English approach to this award of damages according to loss of amenity damages. 
27
 See in this regard Webb (2006) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 41. 
28
 A term that appears to have come into popular usage since being proposed in Friedmann (1995) 
Law Quarterly Review 628; See further Webb (2006) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 41; B Coote 
“Contract Damages, Ruxley, and the Performance Interest” (1997) 56 Cambridge Law Journal 537. 
29
 Fuller & Perdue (1936) Yale Law Journal 54. 
30
 The performance interest is broader in that it captures the actual value the plaintiff holds in its 
performance, which appropriately caters for sentimental or subjectively considered value; See further 
Friedmann (1995) Quarterly Law Review 629-30 who notes further that it is for this reason that 
despite the seminal nature of Fuller & Perdue (1936) Yale Law Journal 52 invaluable in its capturing 
of the understanding of the compensatory role of remedies of breach of contract, it cannot fully 
explain a theory of contract as it does not account for the full performance interest which would be 
achieved by specific performance. 
31
 A term adopted from Smith “Understanding Specific Performance” in Comparative Remedies for 





than the performance interest. This is demonstrable if one considers a grant of 
specific performance as a patrimonial entitlement:32 then when viewed through the 
lens of compensation, a monetary substitute in lieu of its award would be an award 
placing the plaintiff in a position as if specific performance were granted. This 
position would take no account for pre-trial changes in value of the performance, as 
would need to be accounted for in compensation for the performance interest. This 
means compensation for a grant of specific performance would be an award for a 
monetary substitute for the performance less any costs that would otherwise 
necessarily have been paid in order to effect specific performance.33 
This conception of the specific performance interest and its distinction from the 
performance interest can be demonstrated in the development of English 
jurisprudence of „damages in lieu of specific performance‟ as a monetary award.34 
Jurisdiction for this award was granted under the English Chancery Amendment Act 
1858. The Chancery Division famously in Wroth v Tyler35 noted that „damages in lieu 
of specific performance‟ could be higher than common law damages. Such became 
especially evident during a period experiencing a rapid appreciation in the value of 
land. The court found that common law damages had to be measured at the time of 
breach and so could not account for the pre-trial increase in value of the land. But 
                                                          
32
 Such an idea is not exceedingly foreign in modern South African law. It is a growing trend with 
increasing value and reliance placed on securitisation (such as with securities trade, shares and 
cession law) and on the value of incorporeal property (such as intellectual property and trademark 
law) to conceptualise the personal right of performance in a contract as a patrimonial entitlement, 
which as such does not require any new leap in jurisprudence, merely only that proper consideration 
of the patrimonial consequences in the existing theory be considered. 
33
 It can be noted even at this early stage of the theory put forward in this paper that this monetary 
substitute for a grant of specific performance is still, by the nature of being awarded by means of 
substitute for the actual agreed performance, a form of compensation. The word „surrogate‟ in itself 
entails no more than this substitute form as can be seen from its meaning in the Oxford English 
Dictionary. It is the nature of the very remedy of damages to consider its substitute award 
comparatively in relation to the position that would otherwise have been occupied by the plaintiff. This 
position is often compared through the means of a standardised measurement of market value in 
relation to the position of the plaintiff that would otherwise stand. However, this proposed method of 
comparison is not the only method. One can simply compare the positions by means of equivalent 
monetary substitute as has been widely held in modern South African literature. Then one can 
consider the stated price or an objective determination of the performance as substitute for 
performance. The problem is that the basis of such remedy does not underlie any intention or interest 
of the parties under their contract. In other words it does not attach to either the performance interest 
or the specific performance interest. The above proposed compensatory comparison as such cannot 
be effected by way of an equivalent monetary substitute. Although such is usually the conception 
considered in South African law of surrogate damages, it is suggested that the proposed conception 
as being damages for the specific performance interest is not only more consonant with contract 
theory in general, but would effect a more fair result in accounting for costs incumbent upon the 
creditor for an award of specific performance. This idea of assessment will be considered more below. 
34
 See Smith “Understanding Specific Performance” in Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract 
227-232 whose argument on pre-trial increases shall be used below and adapted here in the context 
of South African law. 
35





having denied the grant for specific performance Megarry J allowed a claim for 
damages in lieu thereof by which he meant that these damages were a substitute for 
specific performance to be assessed by reference to the time of trial and as such 
would include the pre-trial increase in value in the award for damages. Some 
subsequent English cases, however, brought doubt to this position.36 
This idea also became evident in Canadian jurisprudence which developed on this 
English rule in Wroth. The Ontario Court of Appeal practically accepted and applied 
Wroth despite doubts floating around in both the English law as well as in their own 
Canadian law.37 In Semelhago v Paramadevan38 there was a breach of contract to 
convey an estate in land. The plaintiff was to pay $205 000 for the purchase of 
house under construction: $75 000 which was to be paid in cash, and $130 000 to be 
raised and paid through mortgaging and selling his current house over a 6-month 
closing period. However, the defendant reneged on the agreement 4 months in and 
then conveyed the land to a third party. At the time of trial the contracted property 
was valued at $325 000. The Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) allowed the 
plaintiff an election between specific performance in forma specifica or to claim 
damages in lieu of specific performance.39 Upon the plaintiff‟s election for damages 
in lieu of specific performance the court held in favour of the plaintiff and made a 
damages award of $120 000: being the difference between the market value of the 
property at the time of trial and the purchase price agreed in the contract.40 
On appeal, however, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that certain amounts were 
deductible from the award; namely:  
 
i. The interest which the plaintiff had avoided paying on the mortgage which 
he would otherwise have needed to pay in order in order to buy the estate. 
ii. The interest earned on the money which would have otherwise been used 
for the down payment. 
iii. And the legal fees that the plaintiff would have otherwise paid in 
conveyance.41  
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 See for example Johnston v Agnew [1980] AC 367, 400 (HL). 
37
 See for example Ontario Ltd v Rimes (1979) 25 OR (2d) 79, 100 DLR (3d) 350 (Ont CA). 
38
 [1996] 2 SCR 415; 136 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC). 
39
 It can be noted that the Canadian terminology specifically construes the damages claim as being „in 
lieu of specific performance‟. 
40
 This is the position as if specific performance were to be awarded – the market value of the 
property less the cost to effect specific performance. 
41
 These are factors measured retrospectively at the time of breach and as such reflect the more 






As such the damages award as substitute for specific performance was 
accordingly reduced to $81 000. 
The defendant again appealed this damages award in the Supreme Court of 
Canada on the argument that the plaintiff had by consequence of the breach held 
onto his own property which had also appreciated significantly during the period up 
until trial. As such the defendant wished to show that given that the plaintiff‟s own 
property had risen during this period, so too were his losses reduced; and 
accordingly pleaded that damages be reduced to $5 000 – that is that the plaintiff 
would, if the performance were forthcoming, have lost out on the $76 000 increase in 
his own retained property.  
This argument by the defendant reflects the traditional conception of id quod 
interest in accounting for the actual performance interest; or upon Mommsen‟s 
difference theory,42 which is the basis of our courts calculation of traditional 
damages, requiring the hypothetical position of the plaintiff (where the breach had 
not occurred) to be offset by the actual standing patrimonial position of the plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this argument and affirmed the correctness 
(with reservation on the deductions) of the decision of the Ontario Appeal Court. La 
Forest J stated that:  
 
“I would not deduct from this amount the increase in value of the respondent‟s 
residence which he retained when the deal did not close. If the respondent had 
received a decree of specific performance, he would have had the property contracted 
for and retained the amount of the rise in value of his property. Damages are to be 
substituted for the decree of specific performance. I see no basis for deductions that 
are not related to the value of the property which was the subject of the contract. To 
make such deductions would depart from the principle that damages are to be a true 
equivalent of specific performance.”43  
 
This conception of surrogate damages in Semelhago demonstrates the distinction 
between the specific performance interest and the performance interest. The former 
being compensation by a monetary substitute for the position should a decree of 
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 Van der Merwe et al Contract 358 n 238 which refers to Friedrich Mommsen‟s „Differenztheorie‟ as 
originally formulated in Zur Lehre von dem Interesse (1855); see further HJ Erasmus “Aspects of the 
History of the South African Law of Damages” (1975) 38 THRHR 104 113-114. 
43





specific performance be granted; and the latter as compensation for the position as if 
the performance was forthcoming according to the contract. It can be noted that the 
Ontario Appeal Court‟s accepted deductions do appear to take retrospective 
elements that are consequent upon an ordinary damages assessment of the 
performance interest into account in this award. These deductions were, however, 
criticised by La Forest J of the Supreme Court of Canada in saying he had 
„reservations of the propriety of these deductions‟, but found that without cross-
appeal by the respondents with respect to the award of damages the award was 
binding.44 As such there appears strong obiter suggestion by La Forest J that these 
deductions are misplaced in the concept of surrogate damages in Canadian law, 
which accords with the proposed theory of specific performance interest damages. 
An ordinary conception of damages aims to place the plaintiff in a position as if 
the contract had been performed. But damages as a substitute for specific 
performance upon this Canadian Semelhago conception does not seek to place the 
plaintiff in the position as if the contract had been properly carried out, but rather to 
put the plaintiff in the position as if an order of specific performance had been 
granted and effected. And Semelhago demonstrates how this remedy can 
compensate beyond the position of fulfilment of the contract – that is, beyond the 
performance interest. If fulfilment of the contract were the measure of the award, the 
defendant would have rightly been entitled to the deduction of the plaintiff‟s increase 
in retained property (assuming and as was the case herein, being part of the 
financing agreement that the defendant can prove that the plaintiff would have 
otherwise sold the property). As such Semelhago can be construed as providing 
some patrimonial entitlement in the grant of specific performance which can be 
awarded, at the election of the plaintiff, as either in forma specifica or by monetary 
compensation.45 And this explains the reason why surrogate damages would not 
need to account for the value gained through retaining the old property – as such 
would not need to be deducted for a grant of specific performance in forma specifica.  
This conception allows a theory of contract to account for the theoretical and 
purposive distinctions between the reason for a grant of specific performance and 
that of contractual damages. Damages protect the plaintiff‟s performance interest 
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 Para 24. 
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 This can be seen in the fact that if one looks back hypothetically on the facts of Semelhago v 
Paramadevan 1996 2 SCR 415 and were to suppose that the plaintiff elected specific performance in 
forma specifica, the resultant enforcement of transfer would still have placed the plaintiff in a position 





insofar as compensation in terms of money can do so in accordance with its rules on 
limitation of liability. However, the remedy of specific performance protects the 
specific performance interest as triggered upon breach. And when this remedy is 
awarded in the form of a monetary surrogate it functions as a compensatory 
substitute for this interest, which would avoid the traditional rules on limitation of 
liability as such are not accounted for in an award of specific performance.46 
This specific performance interest could also be explained as being the 
performance interest brought forward from the time of breach to be considered 
activated at the point of court enforcement.47 Furthermore despite being expressed 
as a „true equivalent of specific performance‟48 this does not entail market value 
analysis is being precluded – in fact Semelhago expressly formulates the specific 
performance interest as the difference in market value to the price to be paid. This 
construction attaches as an equivalent value to specific performance and not of the 
performance – as is widely constructed in the South African literature. It is therefore 
submitted that alternative constructions which focus on „commensurate monetary 
value of the performance expected under the contract‟ or such similar ideas focusing 
on the equivalency of the performance in monetary terms are mistaken in taking a 
view with only one eye open in failing to distinguish the role of the performance 
interest damages and specific performance interest damages.49 
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 See Erasmus, Gauntlet & Visser “Damages” in LAWSA 7 para 56 for an alternative explanation in 
that a duty to mitigate damages arises only upon rescission since the contract is otherwise in full 
operation; See also JM Potgieter et al Visser & Potgieter Law of Damages 362 n 103. This distinction 
is reminiscent of the earlier discussed distinction between the remedy flowing from the contract itself 
as opposed to from its breach. It is submitted, as above, this distinction does not properly account for 
a theory of contract which provides for the availability of surrogate damages. However, such can be 
properly understood and explained upon distinguishing the interests to which compensation is being 
awarded: id est the performance interest and the specific performance interest. 
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 This idea appears to be captured by DJ Joubert Contract: General Principles of the Law of Contract 
(1987) 257 where he states that: 
“Since the creditor can in cases where he does not in fact rescind the agreement claim specific 
performance, whether or not the court will grant the decree, and damages as the surrogate of 
performance in the alternative, it would appear that the creditor can claim the value of the goods at the 
time of the action and is not restricted to the value at the time of delivery. … This means the creditor can 
claim either the value at the time fixed for delivery or the value at the time of the action, whichever is the 
higher.” (Emphasis added). 
Joubert seems to therefore already offer in South African law a statement of this remedy which 
accounts for pre-trial increases – although the framing of the last sentence appears not to adequately 
reflect the separate conceptual bases of the remedies as discussed above. It is submitted that the last 
sentence should as such be considered and understood rather in light of the discussion above of the 
distinction of a claim for the performance interest as per the usual id quod interest damages and that 
of the specific performance interest by a monetary surrogate. One can then understand this last line 
to mean that a creditor can claim id quod interest damages in conjunction to specific performance 
interest damages and as such the claim could go beyond the specific performance value. 
48
 1996 2 SCR 415; 136 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC)  para 19. 
49
 See S Rowan Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Analysis of the Protection of 





Upon this conception of a specific performance interest damages one can attempt 
to justify and explain J C de Wet‟s dual form construction of specific performance in 
South African law of contract. It is a form of compensation for specific performance 
enforcement in the sense of granting damages for the specific performance interest 
– as opposed to damages for the performance interest. As such it is proposed that a 
label as „damages as a surrogate for (or in lieu of) specific performance‟, as opposed 
to „damages as a surrogate of performance‟ and such similar widespread 
constructions in South African legal literature, would better reflect this remedy by 
tying it to the interest it compensates.50  
 
4 Some normative and evaluative considerations 
 
An issue that has often been raised to the concept of surrogate damages is that it 
is „overcompensatory‟.51 But such would not be a unique criticism against the 
concept of surrogate damages.52 This is demonstrable by the above conception of a 
specific performance interest, in that to hold such view would be an argument 
against specific performance in toto.53 This paper is very much limited in scope to the 
notion of surrogate performance and so cannot fully explore this topic of the 
justificatory basis for specific performance as a remedy, but will briefly mention two 
apparent failures of this criticism in relation to surrogate damages. 
First, the acknowledgement of specific performance as the primary remedy for 
breach of contract in South African law demonstrates a normative failure of the 
criticism in our jurisdiction.54 This is to say that from a normative perspective, built 
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 See for instance Hutchison & Du Bois “Contracts” in Wille’s Principles 876; JM Potgieter et al Visser 
& Potgieter Law of Damages 201; Van der Merwe et al Contract 328, 355. 
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 See for example Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 2 SA 371 (A) 378H-379 where it is 
stated that “the cost to the defendant in being compelled to perform is out of all proportion to the 
corresponding benefit to the plaintiff and the latter can equally well be compensated by an award of 
damages”. 
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 This indeed is an issue considered by E Yorio “In Defence of Money Damages for Breach of 
Contract” (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1365 1398-1402, especially nn 183 and 186. However 
Yorio also shows that there is a distinction in the award as the “strict rule” of specific performance (in 
forma specifica) and the „modified rule‟ of specific performance (as a surrogate damage) entail 
different transaction costs. The „liquidity cost‟ which results from damages can still be larger than the 
„opportunity cost‟ and so transaction costs vary. As such the position may depend on low costs in 
negotiating specific performance as well as low transaction costs in line with Coase Theorem. Due to 
the limited scope of this paper these assumptions will be accepted for the sake of argument. 
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upon our foundational principles of contract,55 a grant of specific performance upon 
claim by the plaintiff is subject only to the court‟s equitable discretion to refuse it, and 
so justifies the entitlement to the interest. As such these fundamental cornerstones 
of the theory of contract in South Africa would also serve as normative justification 
for specific performance interest damages – being only a compensatory surrogate 
thereto – as they protect the same interest. 
Secondly, from an evaluative perspective it is a point of contention whether there 
is any definitive empirical evidence of justification that would either favour or 
preclude a grant of specific performance, and therefore its surrogate form. The 
availability of the remedy necessarily depends on the conception of „rights‟ we adopt 
which inherently take some distribution of resources for granted. This as Robert 
Gordon56 poignantly notes involves a presupposed or decided economic assumption 
as to the normative distributive consequences that we follow. This legal realist 
position is a nature of law argument which necessarily sees law as an instrument of 
domination in the sense of legitimating a particular social order and its inequalities 
and hierarchies.57 Robert Hale58 famously shows that acknowledging that law has 
coercive and distributive consequences is not a criticism in itself, as to shift the 
status quo necessarily involves further coercive and distributive choices, and so 
again relies on distributional assumptions or mandate. It is a consequence of the 
nature of law itself which Hale argues can only be justified by a reflection and 
awareness of these assumptions of distribution and coercion so as to rightly 
acknowledge them in legal reasoning. As such the criticism of overcompensation of 
specific performance cannot hold evaluative weight to sink the notion without a fuller 
and deeper understanding of these coercive and distributive arguments.59 The 
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 The cornerstones of the law of contract are: (i) freedom of contract (which again presupposes a 
normative favour towards humanism and individualism as it developed and influenced the Roman-
Dutch law in the 17
th
 century); (ii) sanctity of contract, or its historical Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda 
(which again has historical presuppositions towards „duty‟ conceptions of law as developed through 
canon law); (iii) good faith (as a historical development from Roman law of consensual contracts 
bonae fidei before the development of a generalised theory of contract law); and (iv) privity of contract 
(which again follows much of the philosophical developments of humanism and individualism). 
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 See  RW Gordon “Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approach to Law” (1987) 15 Florida State 
University Law Review 423. 
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 On this nature of law theory generally see  AC Hutchinson “Mice Under a Chair: Democracy, Courts 
and the Administrative State” (1990) 40 University of Toronto Law Journal 374 403; See also the 
seminal work of legal realist RL Hale “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State” 
(1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 470. 
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school of economic analysis of the law has for the past three decades or so 
attempted to specifically answer this evaluative question of the reason to grant 
specific performance, or rather a reason not to grant it. It attempts to do so through 
the concept of economic efficiency – that is whether there is a maximisation of utility 
in its award or not. But efficiency analysis it would seem can yet offer a definitive 
answer as to when and if specific performance should be granted given the absence 
of empirical evidence about „transaction costs‟.60 This is a point of contention and 
continued debate under economic analysis as to the efficiency of the availability or 
the non-availability of specific performance.61 
So following Hale‟s idea, given our particular choice of distribution which the law 
enforces, one cannot properly say that specific performance over-compensates 
without some comparator to an alternative choice of distribution. So necessarily by 
saying specific performance overcompensates assumes a comparator – namely it 
assumes damages as the correct position. And turning this idea on its head, if one is 
to assume for the sake of argument that specific performance were actually the 
primary remedy and the correct remedy, one could say unblushingly that rather 
damages undercompensates. One necessarily makes a normative choice in the 
relevant remedy with underlying assumptions of the conception of the right, which 
are based on legal reasoning and judicial policy as developed through value 
judgments in the development of the common law of contract in South African law. 
This is a topic for much fuller investigation, but what this argument seeks to 
demonstrate for the purpose of this paper is that on this explanation of specific 
performance interest damages one cannot claim on a theory of contract that 
surrogate damages would overcompensate where it is seen that specific 
performance would not do so as well, unless equitable factors are specifically raised 
to the enforcement being in the form of a monetary award. This would seem best 
resolved by the courts‟ equitable discretion to refuse its award upon extension of the 
Benson rule.62 
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 See for further depth E Posner “Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success 
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However, effecting the specific performance interest, whether in forma specifica or 
by way of monetary surrogate, can cost the defendant more than what is gained after 
breach (that is that part or all of the pre-trial increase may not have gone to the 
benefit of the defendant) and so can be said to „over-disgorge‟ as well.63 As such 
disgorgement of profit theory is also not a full explanation for specific performance 
interest damages. Therefore, one cannot fully explain specific performance interest 
damages as placing the plaintiff in the position he or she would have been should 
the contract have been duly performed (the performance interest); nor either as 
placing the defendant in the position as if the contract had been duly performed (a 
disgorgement of profit interest).64 Rather, as Lionel Smith puts it: 
 
“When specific performance is granted, the court is denying the defendant has the 
ability to choose, unilaterally, to put an end to the contract and pay damages. 
Performance (not a right to be compensated for loss of the performance interest) 




As such where one is unable to claim specific performance in forma specifica by 
impossibility, or where it is refused by the court on principles of equity, the court 
could still uphold the integrity of a contract as far as is then possible by damages as 
a surrogate for specific performance.66 This can be justified on the fundamental 
principles of pacta sunt servanda by preventing a promisor from unilaterally electing 
to breach upon an informed calculation of the expected contractual damages cost for 
such breach, as mitigated by the rules for contractual damages, against potential 
gain upon the breach. Therefore the evaluative justification that can be entailed from 
this approach of more fully protecting the specific performance interest with  
surrogate damages is that it more fully protects the integrity of the contract, making it 
an even more valuable and certain institution, and as such a more valuable 
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 Smith “Understanding Specific Performance” in Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract 230. 
Such can be exampled by illustration in Semelhago: if one were to find that the defendant had sold on 
the property to a third party for less than the value it was worth at the time of trial, then the specific 
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 See further MA Eisenberg “The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law” (2006) 105 Michigan Law 
Review 559. 
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commodity as a personal right. This benefits the promisee in being more certain of 
the remedial outcome;67 and benefits the promisor in that again certainty avoids 
extraneous transaction costs upon breach (such as legal fees or arbitration 
expenses). So having an „over-compensatory‟ remedy paradoxically improves the 
position of all contractants in that by upholding its credibility to a higher standard it 
becomes a more valuable vinculum iuris. As such a contractant could be more 
certain of the financial outcome of a contract and then ascertain a higher ex ante 
price given the higher level of security offered within contractual bonds.68 
 
5 The scope of specific performance interest damages  
 
To simply equate the requirements and considerations for specific performance 
interest enforcement as a surrogate with those of its in forma specifica award, 
however, would be this time to hold a view with one eye closed. For effecting the 
specific performance interest as a monetised substitute implicates factors beyond 
enforcement in forma specifica.  Jansen JA in ISEP is correct in considering the 
issue that granting surrogate damages raises the question of ancillary rules such 
as:69  
 
i. Whether the plaintiff has a choice between specific performance in 
forma specifica or as damages in lieu thereof;70 
ii. Whether such award rests only on considerations of the plaintiff‟s 
choice, or in other words whether the defendant could still discharge 
the obligation by specific performance in forma specifica should the 
plaintiff elect for damages as a surrogate; and 
iii. If specific performance is refused on the court‟s equitable discretion 
would this necessarily be a refusal of it in the form of a substitute, or 
could the court still grant it in the alternative form. 71 
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These are valid issues, but which are not insurmountable and perfectly catered to 
a common law system which can answer these casuistically on the circumstances of 
each case. It is submitted also that the framework for these answers is already 
present within the courts‟ considered requirements of specific performance. The two 
essential requirements in South African law for a grant of specific performance are 
authoritatively laid down in Farmer’s Co-Operative Society (Reg) v Berry72 that: 
 
i. The plaintiff must have performed or be ready to carry out his or her 
own obligations as per the principle of reciprocity; and 
ii. The defendant must be in a position to perform – that is objective and 
subjective possibility of performance. 
 
A third requirement in light of Haynes, as confirmed by Benson, must also be 
added hereto:  
 
iii. That the grant of specific performance must not be against public policy 
– or put differently, that the principles of equity do not militate for its 
refusal to be granted. 
 
Propositions (i) would be accounted for in specific performance interest damages 
as demonstrated by Semelhago; however propositions (ii) and (iii) are implicated 
should the performance be altered to a monetary substitute. 
 
5 1 Consideration of proposition (ii) – subjective and objective possibility, and  
Jansen JA‟s first and second questions 
The possibility of performance raises a new consideration if one provides the 
availability of compensation in lieu of specific performance. Rules regarding the 
instances of surrogate performance would need to be considered by the court. It is 
submitted here that because supervening impossibility is said to ordinarily extinguish 
the obligation and release the debtor if the impossibility was due to vis maior or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“If specific performance were to be refused because it would operate "unreasonably hardly" on the 
defendant, would the plaintiff still be entitled to the objective value of the performance itself? It 
would seem not – otherwise the very hardship leading to refusal of the specific performance could still be 
inflicted upon the debtor by granting the objective value of the performance, as would be illustrated by the 
case of an obligation to reinstate in respect of a building destined for immediate demolition. In a case such 
as the present, the award of the objective value (reasonable costs of reinstatement) would be as 
unreasonable as an order for specific performance.” 
72





casus fortuitus, it would naturally follow that specific performance cannot be awarded 
being a remedy of the first category discussed above – namely one aimed at keeping 
the contract alive.73 As such it naturally follows that surrogate damages as a form of 
specific performance would also in principle be unavailable. 
This general rule on supervening objective impossibility is qualified in instances 
where either the debtor was in mora at the time (mora being said to perpetuate the 
obligation), or otherwise where he or she undertook the risk of performance 
becoming impossible (for example by express or tacit term in the contract).74 In such 
cases, however, if the obligation is said to continue then specific performance in 
principle should be available. Enforcement in forma specifica would be impossible 
and so only a claim of damages in lieu of specific performance would be available. 
Furthermore where one of the parties is responsible for the impossibility, such 
conduct would normally amount to breach of contract, generally called „prevention of 
performance‟. Fault is an essential element for this form of breach, as judged 
according to the usual standard of the reasonable person.75 If prevention makes 
performance subjectively or relatively impossible then the obligation in the literature 
is said to remain in force and the usual pattern of rules for remedy on breach follow, 
with exception that, by the very nature of the breach, specific performance in forma 
specifica cannot be granted.76 However, the breach in principle still triggers the 
specific performance interest. And because of the fault of the breaching party this 
consequent impossibility should not validly vitiate this interest of the plaintiff. In 
principle it follows then that the obligation need not said to have terminated and that 
specific performance is available to the debtor, but only in the form of damages in 
lieu thereof. This remedy seems accepted in the literature and would as such be 
better explained on this analysis as not terminating the obligation, but providing the 
specific performance interest in a surrogate damages form.77 
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Where prevention of performance results in objective impossibility the debtor is 
again said to still remain liable;78 but, being objectively impossible, this liability 
cannot exist for the original agreed performance. It would seem already the law 
recognised a monetary award must substitute liability in such an instance, but 
whether such remedy is by nature one of damages or of surrogate damages is a 
matter of contention.79 It would follow on theory again that if this obligation is not said 
to terminate upon prevention of performance then in principle specific performance is 
available and would as such only be able to be enforced as compensation in lieu 
thereof. As such specific performance interest damages would provide a theoretically 
sound measure for such an award. The difference in this instance is that objective 
impossibility means that its measure is made purely in the hypothetical in that no 
objectively available comparison to the position the plaintiff would hold on 
enforcement of specific performance is available. If for example the house in 
Semelhago was destroyed, one could operate only within the hypothetical value of 
the property. This is not theoretically problematic as it follows from the very nature of 
compensation being a substitute. Furthermore given the consonance one would 
desire in prevention of performance remedies, being classified both as instances of 
fault-based breach rather than ones of the type of impossibility, the same remedy in 
the position of subjective impossibility should in principle be available. This also 
follows on the general principle of law that a party should not benefit from his or her 
own wrongdoing; as well as can be justified on the specific performance interest 
analysis in that specific performance interest damages should be awarded so that 
the breaching party cannot elect to terminate the obligation by breach and choosing 
to merely suffer contractual damages. 
These considerations on the requirement of fault for prevention of performance, 
as well as this reasoning towards a specific performance interest award, apply 
mutatis mutandis to prevention by a creditor.80 
In MV Snow Crystal Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner of MV 
Snow Crystal81 the appellant breached a contract to make available a dry dock at the 
Cape Town harbour for the docking of the respondent‟s vessel for a two-week period 
despite booking at least six months in advance and the availability of an alternative 
dry dock for the other vessel but not the respondent‟s. Scott JA finding on the facts 
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that time was clearly of the essence the appellant was in mora ex re on interpretation 
of the time of performance per the contract.82 Scott JA was also not persuaded that 
supervening possibility occurred given the ability to move the other docked vessel, 
and as such was rather one of prevention of performance.83 As such Scott JA 
confirmed the damages awards under all three heads of the court a quo: that (i) cost 
of cleaning the bottom of the vessel and the propeller while the vessel was afloat in 
Cape Town harbour as a temporary measure necessary to remove the accumulated 
underwater growth so as to enable the vessel to operate efficiently until such time 
as the work could be done properly in a dry dock;84 (ii) certain costs for painting the 
vessel for display to charterers given that had the work been done at a dry dock it 
would have otherwise lasted another three years, but due to the breach would need 
to be redone;85 (iii) loss of charter hire during the period the vessel was then 
subsequently dry docked at another dry dock due to the appellant‟s breach.86 These 
damages follow as compensation for the id quod interest after the contract was 
validly cancelled upon breach, being a contract found to be where time was of the 
essence.87 This case is noted to show that if the agreement were not cancelled and 
instead damages in lieu of specific performance were claimed, it would make 
available damages as the market value of the dry dock service less the agreed price, 
together with all the above listed id quod interest damages. Given that this booking 
was made six months in advance the claim for the market value of the dry dock 
service less its initial contract price can be of significant value. This damages award 
would also be equitable in that it either disgorges the defendant of any profitable 
benefit gained as result of the breach, or even if this benefit was not realised by the 
defendant (for example by having ceded his or her book debts in anticipando to a 
third party) it nevertheless operates as a deterrent against breach having had the 
possibility of the gain subsequent to breach which could act within the party‟s mind 
on considering whether to abide by his or her contractual obligation. As such this 
remedy can bring a party in two minds on performing his or her obligation closer to 
the ad idem consensus of its formation.  
As such proposition (ii) of Farmer’s Co-op would be extended by the availability of 
a surrogate damages remedy as both subjective and objective possibility of the in 
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forma specifica performance need not necessarily be available for the surrogate 
award, so extending further protection to the specific performance interest. This 
availability and extended protection can naturally be limited by a court‟s equitable 
discretion to refuse specific performance such as in instances of undue hardship. 
On consideration of these factors one can perhaps reason some answers to 
Jansen JA‟s first and second questions. It is submitted that naturally performance in 
forma specifica is the primary mode of enforcement for specific performance. This is 
a natural normative consequence of the current law of South Africa which holds 
specific performance as the primary ready.88 That is to say these cases of 
enforcement of specific performance presuppose the primacy of specific 
performance in forma specifica. Surrogate damages would as such be a secondary 
mode of specific performance available at the court‟s equitable discretion. That is 
that in instances of the court‟s equitable discretion to refuse specific performance 
according to the Benson rule that it then, when finding it equitable to refuse specific 
performance in forma specifica, first consider surrogate damages as a monetary 
substitute before its complete refusal for specific performance. To put this in the form 
of a rule for the sake of clarity it could be constructed as follows: the court must in 
principle give effect to the plaintiff‟s specific performance interest, first and foremost 
in its terms ex consensu, otherwise as an equivalent monetary surrogate, subject 
only to the court‟s equitable discretion to refuse such specific performance in 
appropriate cases.89 
As such one could consider the extended proposition (ii), allowing surrogate 
damages even in instances of subjective and objective prevention of performance, to 
help answer Jansen JA‟s first and second question, in that its extension requires 
rules to limit liability on equitable considerations. Specific performance interest 
damages could not be entirely at the election of the plaintiff as in instances of 
prevention of performance there would be no election. And given the principles of 
pacta sunt servanda, freedom of contract and good faith it could follow that in forma 
specifica enforcement should be the primary-mode of the specific performance 
remedy as such would generally most accurately uphold and effect the intentions 
and expectations of the parties. The mode of enforcement could otherwise be seen 
to rest within the equitable discretion of the court in each case; however the integrity 
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of contract rests in its value of certainty, and as such a general proposition of 
availability would be preferable. Therefore having in forma specifica as the primary 
mode and surrogate damages as a secondary mode seems better aligned with 
contract theory and practical commercial utility considerations. The availability this 
secondary-mode specific performance remedy could then act as a via media 
between specific performance in forma specifica and its refusal (leaving only id quod 
interest damages). The discussion of MV Snow Crystal shows this possible benefit.  
In instances of what shall be called a „surrogate damages clause‟, agreeing to 
provide for damages as term in the contract, such would merely be an instance of 
specific performance enforcement in forma specifica and so would fall under this 
primary mode of consideration.90 Otherwise its enforcement would be in the 
secondary form of specific performance. This is implicates proposition (iii) and 
Jansen JA‟s third question. 
 
5 2 Factors on proposition (iii) – undue hardship and equitable discretion, and  
Jansen JA‟s third question 
The court as such would need to consider in the circumstances whether there is 
equitable reason to refuse granting the specific performance interest in forma 
specifica or else as surrogate damages. The case of Ruxley91 demonstrates an 
instance where for reasons of undue hardship and on policy considerations against 
making an order which is economically inefficient, the court would find it has an 
equitable discretion to refuse specific performance. Ruxley is an English case 
concerning the building of a swimming pool at a specified diving depth. The 
performance was defective in building the pool only 6 feet in depth when the contract 
was for a pool of 7 feet and 6 inches. However, evidence was led to show this depth 
was suitable for diving purposes and that the deeper depth at 7 feet 6 inches would 
not affect the market value of the property. This case will be considered in greater 
detail below, but for present purposes this case is mentioned as an example where 
effecting specific performance would require digging up a pool, which is a costly and 
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economically inefficient remedy which could arguably act „unreasonably hardly‟92 on 
the defendant. This result of in forma specifica enforcement in South African law may 
be seen like in Haynes to operate as an unreasonable hardship which would 
preclude its specific enforcement. However, so too would damages as a surrogate of 
specific performance in the strict sense. Upon the specific performance interest 
analysis such damages would necessarily be the cost it would take to correct the 
defect, which would still be an onerous and economically inefficient enforcement.93 
This lends credence to Jansen JA‟s observation in ISEP that the „very hardship 
leading to refusal of the specific performance could still be inflicted upon the debtor‟ 
in a grant of surrogate damages, as was also his view in ISEP concerning the 
demolition of the building.94 
But this instance can be contrasted with Haynes where the respondent 
municipality had contracted to release 250 000 gallons of water per day to Haynes, 
but breached this obligation in a period of unprecedented severe drought.  Haynes‟s 
claim for specific performance was refused on the ground that it „would have worked 
very great hardship not only to the respondent but to the citizens of Kingwilliamstown 
to whom the respondent owed a public duty to render an adequate supply of 
water‟.95 In such a case involving a municipality, with the vast backing of government 
resources, an award of specific performance may indeed cause undue hardship and 
interfere with its public duty when concerning a resource such as water which was 
particularly scarce during that period; but where specific performance interest 
damages would not necessarily raise these same considerations. In such a case 
consequential loss would be of relevance; but with a shortage of water its market 
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value may have rapidly appreciated, and as such an award of damages as a 
surrogate of performance could yield a stronger interest for the plaintiff in claiming 
this market value less the agreed price according to specific performance interest 
damages which account for pre-trial increase in value.  
However, such a case may also evoke public policy issues militating against its 
award. For instance the potential chilling effect through extending liability and 
opening the door to claims for heavy and unanticipated increases in market value, 
which could stifle tender processes and public contracts. This, however, would be a 
matter for consideration on the facts of each case. It follows then that the recognised 
category of undue hardship as a basis for the refusal of specific performance could 
extend also as a refusal for an award of surrogate damages if it is to be considered 
an available remedy in South African law. Specific performance interest damages 
would therefore need to undergo the same equitable analysis as for specific 
performance in forma specifica in each case. 
Another example of instance where specific performance interest damages would 
implicate different factors is illustrated in the case of insolvency. Somchem (Pty) Ltd 
v Federated Insurance Co Ltd & another96 where Friedman J finds that the trustee of 
an insolvent can elect to repudiate the contract, upon which the promisee is denied 
the remedy of specific performance. In other words the contract survives and merely 
rests upon the decision of the trustee to uphold or cancel the contract – much as any 
contractant may repudiate the contract, but with the exception that in such case the 
other party could enforce specific performance. This rule against enforcement of 
specific performance is explained by the supervening concursus for which the 
trustee is meant to act in the benefit of all creditors.97 An allowance of surrogate 
damages in such an instance could conceivably increase the damages claim. This 
factor implicates a unique consideration in the case of insolvency. Because the 
supervening election of the trustee is on policy grounds provided for the trustee to 
effectively manage the insolvent estate for the benefit of the creditors, it would seem 
that the policy grounds informing the Somchem rule of denying the grant of specific 
performance would extend to specific performance interest damages. As such the 
same underlying reason of the supervening concursus would seem to also apply to 
prevent surrogate damages on insolvency of the promisor.  
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Insolvency after all is a situation where the integrity of a contract is already at 
stake for the reason of the ability of the promisor to actually be able to uphold his or 
her promise; and as such one can further explain the result in that the underlying 
justification of specific performance as upholding the integrity of the contract holds 
less weight as its integrity is already compromised by the promisor‟s insolvency, and 
so strict application of the specific performance interest would also hold less 
justificatory weight. 
These instances demonstrate that proposition (iii) could be used to answer 
Jansen JA‟s third question of whether its refusal in forma specifica necessitates it 
refusal as surrogate. The instance of Somchem in insolvency and Ruxley and ISEP 
as undue hardship cases show instances where indeed that could be the case. 
However, as Hefer JA states in Benson, as quoting from De Villiers AJA in Haynes, 
„the [court‟s] discretion is not circumscribed by rigid rules‟.98 There are no hard and 
fast rules in a court‟s equitable discretion to refuse specific performance; and this, it 
is submitted, would continue should an award of specific performance interest 
damages be available in South African law of contract. Van Winsen AJA‟s judgment 
in ISEP acknowledges this possibility.99 
 
6 BK Tooling’s relaxation of the principle of reciprocity and its parallel to 
specific performance interest damages  
 
The unanimous decision of Jansen JA in BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope 
Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk100 in a grant of a „reduced contract price‟ as 
remedy in a case of non-conformity of performance could be explained in terms of 
this specific performance interest analysis.101 In this case the respondent undertook 
a contractual obligation to hollow out two sets of steel moulds for the appellant 
according to the latter‟s strict specifications that they could be used to make rubber 
mountings for motor-vehicle engines, as against payment of R150 per a mould which 
were to be delivered in two separate batches of 16 moulds each with payment to 
made after delivery of each batch. The first set of moulds was delivered, and 
although the appellant averred these as defective, both the trial court and the 
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Appellate Division found that they were duly accepted by the appellant and so to be 
satisfactory. However, with the second set the appellant proved that upon delivery 
the moulds were not according to specification; but when the respondent requested 
the moulds to be returned in order for it to correct the defective performance, the 
appellant refused and had this correction done by a third party engineering firm.102 
The respondent claimed payment of the whole contract price of R4 800 – that is two 
batches of 16 moulds at R150 each – but the appellant paid only R1 200, alleging 
the cost of correcting the defects had been R3 600. 
The Appellate Division confirmed the trial court‟s order for the full amount to be 
paid in respect of the first set, construing the delivery of batches as divisible 
performance at R2 400 per a set. But with regard to the second set of moulds the 
court rejected a strict application of the doctrine of substantial performance in line 
with the appellant‟s argument so as to avail the appellant with the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus even in instances where the performance rendered is 
substantially compliant with specification. But the court also relaxed the strict 
application of the principle of reciprocity by refusing a strict application of the 
exceptio in allowing in this case where (i) the appellant had utilised the performance 
and (ii) where the considerations of equity prevailed to relax the principle of 
reciprocity in line with the respondent‟s indication of willingness to rectify the defects, 
but was rendered impossible by the appellant‟s correction through another firm, that 
partial enforcement of the reciprocal obligation owing under the contract in the form 
of an award for a reduced contract price of R1 680 to be awarded – that is finding 
that R720 from the R2 400 would be taken from the reciprocal obligation as being 
the cost of the appellant to correct the defective second set of moulds. 
The BK Tooling rule therefore provides that a court may allow a claim for a 
reduced contract price, based upon the cost of remedying the performance, where a 
party has made partial performance, but is unable or unwilling to render complete 
performance and the plaintiff can show:  
 
i. The contractant has not rescinded the contract;103 
                                                          
102
 Although the appellant did not allow the third party firm to complete the work, proceeding to do a 
part thereof itself.  
103
 Otherwise if the contract were rescinded the application of the remedy would be limited to 
contractual damages; See further D Visser Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 553-554 who provides 
under his own proposed taxonomy, with apparent German law influence, that if the performance were 
so defective that the other party has a right to reject the performance and cancel the contract, the 





ii. That the other party has utilised the incomplete or defective 
performance to his or her advantage;104 
iii. That the circumstances are such that it would be equitable for the court 
to exercise its discretion in the plaintiff‟s for a reduced contract price;105 
and 
iv. That the performance is rectifiable and the amount it will cost to 
remedy the performance quantifiable.106 
This BK Tooling remedy of a reduced purchase price has requirements similar to 
those considered in the above section for a grant of surrogate damages. 
Requirements (i), (iii) and (iv) bear particular similarities to those considerations for 
an award of specific performance. And Jansen JA for the unanimous court in BK 
Tooling raises doubt as to requirement (ii) considering already that this requirement 
of utilisation may need to be abandoned.107  
It is submitted in light of these overlapping factors that this remedy in BK Tooling 
can be explained in terms of specific performance interest analysis. The appellant 
raised the exceptio non adimpleti contractus for payment on the second set of 
defective moulds. However, the court applying its equitable discretion allowed an 
award of enforcement of the contract through a partial surrogate damage which 
accordingly reduced the contract price. Upon this analysis one could explain the 
remedy as in effect being an enforcement of specific performance through an award 
of damages as a surrogate therefor. The cost of repairs in line with requirement (iv) 
would represent the deduction that would need to be made from the specific 
performance interest in the mould in order to correct the performance as would be 
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required under an order of specific performance which accounts for the cost incurred 
by the order or other reciprocal obligations. As such specific performance interest 
damages can account for these reciprocal obligations or deductions in the award and 
so can provide a theoretical basis for the remedy in BK Tooling as giving effect to the 
specific performance interest of the respondent with the necessary deduction of the 
cost of correction. 
 
7 Wading through the currently murky position in South African law of 
contract 
 
The current position of the availability of an award of surrogate performance in 
South African law of contract is unclear. Even the widely considered rejection of 
surrogate damages as a remedy independent of ordinary damages in ISEP is a 
muddied by problems of actually identifying the ratio of the majority judgment. As 
much as all the judges made the same order of absolution from the instance, each 
had differing reasons. Four of the five judges construed the claim as one for 
surrogate damages. Hoexter AJA (with Viljoen JA concurring) took the view that 
such is not an independent remedy available in our law; while Van Winsen AJA (with 
Kotzé JA concurring) accepted its availability.108 The fifth judge, Jansen JA, although 
agreeing that the law did not acknowledge a separate claim for damages as a 
surrogate of performance, found the claim was formulated as one for ordinary id 
quod interest damages. As such his judgment‟s view on surrogate damages is 
submitted to be obiter. Therefore according to the rules of stare decisis there was no 
ratio on the issue of the availability of surrogate damages as there was no majority 
rule there was a 2-2 split on the issue of the availability of surrogate damages – 
although the court‟s favour in this case leans towards its rejection.109 
It appears to be widely considered that the decision of ISEP has rejected the 
availability of a claim for surrogate damages in South African law of contract. But this 
is not clear as even Smalberger ADCJ for the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mostert 
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seems to acknowledge it is unclear whether ISEP precludes the availability of the 
remedy. Smalberger ADCJ goes on to say that even if one accepts the majority 
decision as such a preclusion then he would consider the correctness of the decision 
open to doubt and so would consider this rule open to be found  per incuriam.110 
Smalberger ADCJ‟s view on the matter goes even further in that if one for the sake 
of argument were to accept ISEP as a rejection of the availability of surrogate 
damages and also that such rejection was correct, it could still be distinguishable as 
in a case like Mostert.  
It would seem for the present time that at least the South Gauteng High Court has 
decided to completely ignore the possible implications of ISEP or the debate raised 
by Mostert entirely. In Sandown Travel (Pty) Ltd v Cricket South Africa111 Wepener J 
makes no acknowledgment whatsoever to the decision of ISEP or even of Mostert, 
nor even the criticisms of writers or those of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Deloitte 
Haskins. Wepener J appears to simply accept that „damages as a surrogate of 
performance‟ (although as was noted earlier this terminology is considered to 
confuse the protected interest and should rather be labelled „damages as a 
surrogate of specific performance‟) is available in South African law and did not even 
consider a proposition to the contrary – as if this ISEP dilemma never existed. 
Wepener J‟s only source of authority to the proposition is from Visser & Potgieter’s 
Law of Damages.112 This a welcomed decision in its effect, however, it still reflects a 
lingering conceptual problem in the approach of South African law to this remedy.113 
The Sandown decision could be more readily explained as on the Semelhago 
principle that the award, whether termed „damages‟ or otherwise, be one for the 
compensation of the specific performance interest. Upon repudiation by the 
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defendant, the plaintiff travel agency was entitled to claim its full specific 
performance interest by way of damages in lieu thereof given that that the specific 
performance interest should be equitably refused in forma specifica (due to the 
defendant‟s employ of a different travel agency) but not so in toto so as to deny its 
monetary surrogate – a via media remedy between equitable refusal of specific 
performance and one leaving only id quod interest damages. 
 
8 Concluding remarks 
 
It is suggested that the decision in ISEP should be read as a rejection of the 
construction of surrogate damages that pervades the academic literature as being a 
claim for the objective value of performance. This is evident by the decision of all the 
judges in ISEP. As Van Winsen AJA says with Kotzé JA concurring: 
 
“In my view therefore it was open to the plaintiff to pursue a claim for specific 
performance against the defendant to compel the performance of the obligation 
undertaken … in forma specifica, or for an order to pay what it would cost to do so…. 
The claim, however, remains one for specific performance and not damages 
consequent upon a breach of contract and is subject to all the discretionary limitations 




Rather this statement is consonant with a formulation of surrogate damages as 
according to specific performance interest analysis in line with the conception in the 
Canadian case of Semelhago. Van Winsen AJA‟s statement specifically 
acknowledges the distinction to id quod interest damages and that rather it is an 
order to pay what it would cost to effect specific performance. This statement affirms 
De Wet two-form construction of specific performance and acknowledges that 
surrogate damages as a form of specific performance. Furthermore, the statement 
acknowledges that surrogate damages would be subject to the same equitable 
discretion of a court to refuse specific performance as was discussed above. This 
statement it is submitted offers a theoretically sound construction for a claim in line 
with specific performance interest damages and so could offer a basis to argue for its 
acceptance and development in future decisions.  
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However, the position in South African law remains unclear. But given the 
Supreme Court of Appeal‟s inclination to keep the door of surrogate performance 
ajar it is hoped that Van Winsen AJA‟s statement indicates the path for recognition 
and development of this remedy in future decisions, and also to help bring clarity to 
its proper description and formulation. Wepener J‟s approach in the South Gauteng 
High Court indicates the very real the possibility for this area of the law to be further 
considered and clarified in the future. Ultimately the law of contract most importantly 
requires certainty in order to effectively govern the contractual relations between 
parties. And certainty in respect of the nature and extent of remedies upon breach is 
perhaps even more important than the remedy itself – for even if a particular remedy 
enhances the integrity of a contract more so than another, the contract‟s integrity is 
most affected by having certainty with regard to the contractual relation and its forms 
of redress.115 After all, even if it were found that an independent remedy for 
surrogate performance were not available – as in the views if Jansen J, Hoexter AJA 
and Viljoen JA in ISEP – this would still not prohibit parties enacting a clause having 
similar effect as an award of surrogate damages. Such would effectively be a penalty 
clause and be subject to the Conventional Penalties Act 15 of 1962, but would 
nevertheless open some method of tightening the contractual relations between the 
parties to enhance the effectiveness and integrity of their contract. Such would be an 
instance of specific performance in forma specifica as a prescribed enforcement 
according to the terms of the contract, and so would be a method for the parties 
themselves provide for a value for their respective specific performance interest, 
subject to the limitations of the Conventional Penalties Act. 
This paper has attempted to string legal data on surrogate damages in South 
African law of contract with insight from considerations in other jurisdictions so as to 
help illuminate that „silent prologue‟ of jurisprudence which underlies the decisions 
concerning surrogate damages awards.116 This paper has adopted a purposive 
method of approaching the issues of specific performance generally, through a 
conception of a patrimonial entitlement in specific performance, described as a 
specific performance interest; as opposed to the usual performance interest to which 
contract is more commonly weighed and conceived in considering remedies upon 
breach. Despite employing a less common explanation as in terms of a specific 
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performance interest, such issues have always existed in our law since allowing a 
grant of specific performance and this conception within the context of a patrimonial 
interest is merely an attempt to explain and further analyse the concept and the 
issues it raises with regard to surrogate damages.  
Lord Steyn in Farley v Skinner says that it is the desire of any legal order to seek 
“simple and practical rules”.117 But as Kurt Lewin famously proclaimed “[t]here is 
nothing so practical as a good theory”.118 As such it is submitted that this specific 
performance interest theory in relation to the award of damages as a surrogate for 
specific performance is a simple and practical approach. It provides a more effective 
form of deterrence against breach so helping bring a party in two minds on 
performing his or her obligation closer to the ad idem consensus of its formation; and 
where a party does still breach, it offers a remedy fair to both parties by protecting 
the underlying integrity of the law of contract. 
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